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In his well-known speech on the "global savings glut" hypothesis given a few years before the crisis, Ben Bernanke highlighted the importance of international capital fl ows for asset price developments. He stressed a structural difference between countries experiencing current account defi cits with corresponding net capital infl ows and countries with a current account surplus:
(…) countries whose current accounts have moved towards defi cit have generally experienced substantial housing appreciation and increases in housing wealth, while Germany and Japan (…) have not. 1 The role of international net capital fl ows in this view is an initial impetus for house price growth, which leads to increased private consumption via the wealth effects of higher house prices. Second-round effects may lead to further house price increases, which again stimulate the postulated spiral of higher wealth effects, increasing private consumption and house prices. In his "savings glut" speech, Bernanke stressed that capital fl ows into economic sectors or activities without a contribution to sustainable productivity growth entail a risk build-up po-* The article represents the authors' personal opinions and does not necessarily refl ect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 1 B. B e r n a n k e : The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Defi cit, The Sandridge Lecture, Richmond, VA, 2005. tential. This argument is based on the rationale that paying back foreign debt will become more diffi cult if capital fl ows lead to high residential investment and domestic consumption (i.e. activities without sustainable productivity gains). 2 Whether capital infl ows or consumption growth (or other domestic factors) trigger housing market cycles can be seen as a kind of "chicken-or-egg" problem of international economics. On the one hand, Bernanke and others point out that capital fl ows may have initiated a spiral of increasing house prices and higher consumption via wealth effects. On the other hand, some authors argue that a more central role should be attributed to increases in domestic consumption in the fi rst place. According to this view, capital infl ows were needed in order to fi nance increasing consumption activities.
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From net capital fl ows to gross capital fl ows
Several empirical studies support a relatively robust relationship between current account defi cits and increasing house prices. 4 Some of these studies also document that institutional features of housing and mortgage markets -like the prevalence of securitisations -may play an Capital Flows important role for the volume and the potential for a risk build-up from capital infl ows. 5 However, current account defi cits are by no means a necessary prerequisite for a country's vulnerability to a housing boom. Surplus countries like Japan and Switzerland also experienced strong boom-bust cycles culminating in the early 1990s.
An inherent limitation of the discussion regarding the relationship between the current account and house prices is caused by its emphasis on net capital fl ows. Several studies on fi nancial crises have pointed out that an additional focus on gross capital fl ows is necessary. 6 By taking gross fl ows into account, a more differentiated view of separate transmission channels of capital fl ows into housing markets emerges. Figure 1 visualises the different data levels of international capital fl ows for the stylised example of cross-border buying and selling of assets. In general, we follow the terminology of the academic literature on international capital fl ows.
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In order to analyse the possible impact of international capital fl ows on certain sectors of an economy such as, for example, the housing market sector, gross fl ows offer 5 See for example F. S á , P. To w b i n , T. W i e l a d e k : Capital infl ows, fi nancial structure and housing booms, in: Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2014, pp. 522-546; and A. J analytical advantages over net capital fl ows. Gross fl ows, or in particular "gross gross" fl ows, amount to many multiples of the volume of net fl ows. 8 Subsequently, the sectoral composition of capital fl ows matters for fi nancial stability questions. An uneven sectoral distribution of gross fl ows may be easily overlooked in a perspective restricted to net capital fl ows. By infl uencing some sectors more than others, an uneven distribution of gross capital fl ows could promote a risk build-up for fi nancial stability by nurturing asset overvaluations, laxer credit standards and debt sustainability problems.
Transmission channels of capital fl ows for housing markets
Following the rationale for using more granular data on capital fl ows, we distinguish between four transmission channels of international capital fl ows on housing markets: i) the transaction channel, ii) the direct credit channel, iii) an indirect credit channel with regard to cross-border transactions of securitised housing loans and iv) the interest rate channel. Depending on the institutional features of national housing markets, the channels may be of differing importance. Additionally, the relevance of these channels for fi nancial stability differs, as we will point out in the following discussion. A prevalence of pro-cyclical effects via the transactions channel on the domestic housing market is not evident. Rather mixed signals can be observed in the case of the Spanish real estate market. In the run-up to the housing boom, foreign investment increased but always remained at a rather low absolute level. Interestingly, foreign investors poured in new investments -which largely exceeded the volumes of the preceding boom -when market developments had reached a nadir (see Figure 2 ).
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Other country examples also indicate that although foreign real estate investments are often the focus of public attention, they are seldom at the core of fi nancial stability problems. 11 This assessment is also supported by an analysis by de Haan and Kakes regarding the general investment behaviour of Dutch institutional investors.
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According to their results, anti-cyclical patterns predominate in the approach of these institutional investors.
Summing up, although pro-cyclical investment behaviour by foreigners via the transaction channel cannot be totally excluded, our fi ndings and the literature show that such behaviour does not constitute a general trend. Foreign investors often use their own equity to fi nance their purchases or may avail themselves of debt fi nancing generated in their home country. 13 As foreign direct investments therefore do not strongly infl uence debt sustainability in the destination country, fi nancial stability risks ultimately appear rather limited. This is not to say that foreign acquisitions of housing units have no impact on the afford-10 As the data is derived from the Spanish balance of payments, it may also be subject to the restrictions of this data source on foreign real estate transactions, as described above. According to their analysis, foreign investment encouraged more home-building activities, which helped to ease a lack of supply in the Australian housing market. 12 See L. d e H a a n , J. K a k e s : Momentum or contrarian investment strategies: Evidence from Dutch institutional investors, in: Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 35, No. 9, 2011 , pp. 2245 -2251 Nevertheless, debt fi nancing in the destination country could be considered if the interest rate level is signifi cantly lower than in the investor's country of residence. ability of housing in the case of pro-cyclical investment behaviour, especially in cities generally seen as the favourites of international investors like New York, London or Hong Kong. 14 But ultimately, this aspect of affordability is more relevant for general housing policies and social policy questions than for fi nancial stability concerns. It can be clearly benefi cial to ease a demand overhang, for example via more social housing activity in order to limit a house price boom, 15 especially in a situation wherein foreign buying of residential property and increasing public attention to these activities could lead to expectations of further accelerated house price growth. In this case, foreign capital fl ows indirectly infl uence the behaviour of domestic market participants and may therefore promote a risk build-up, which may include debt sustainability problems in the eventual bust of the housing market cycle.
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Direct credit channel
The direct credit channel encompasses mortgage lending from foreign banks' affi liates or branches. Often, this channel is relevant for countries in an earlier stage of financial market development. Another type of cross-border activity which is covered by the direct credit channel is purchases using mortgages denominated in a foreign currency. This kind of fi nancing becomes especially interesting when there are signifi cant interest rate disparities between the countries involved. Both developments entail a signifi cant risk build-up potential, as country experiences illustrate.
A notable example of the problems involved is given by the last boom-bust cycle in Estonia. Foreign banks aggressively stepped up their lending in the Estonian market and thereby helped to fi nance the boom. This increase in foreign loans accelerated debt sustainability problems facing the private sector in Estonia. According to an analysis by the OECD, foreign banks may have underestimat-14 For a discussion of policy options for a case study of Hong Kong, see:
C.-C. C h a o , E.S.H. Yu : Housing Markets with Foreign Buyers, in:
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2015, pp. 207-218. 15 As long as such policy initiatives do not contribute to an overheating in the construction sector, which may lead to even more pronounced fi nancial stability problems. 16 A model which illustrates this case of an expectation-driven housing boom encouraged by foreign capital fl ows is presented in H. To m ur a : International capital fl ows and expectation-driven boom-bust cycles in the housing market, in: Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, Vol. 34, No. 10, 2010 , pp. 1993 -2009 ed the risks involved due to their limited knowledge of the structures of a foreign market.
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Dependencies on foreign credit are often accompanied by vulnerabilities regarding refi nancing activities via foreign-denominated debt or contagion risks from external shocks, which may spill over from the foreign banks' country of origin. In the case of foreign-denominated mortgages, exchange rate developments can trigger a materialisation of risks by contributing to a growing unsustainability of the debt servicing abilities of indebted households. Other catalysts include an adverse impact via the business cycle resulting from problems in the lenders' home country. These external spillovers may boost a domestic credit shortage, thereby enhancing further economic downside effects in the host country.
Indirect credit channel
The increasing securitisation of mortgages enabled an additional transmission channel for international capital fl ows into housing markets prior to the 2007-08 global fi nancial crisis. By bundling single loans into voluminous fi nancial products, mortgages increasingly won the attention of international investors; the motivation for securitisation activities may encompass objectives such as risk transferring, liquidity generation, regulatory arbitrage or a combination of these. The potential impact of capital fl ows via the indirect credit channel obviously depends on the role and the predominant design of securitisations in a specifi c national mortgage market. Whether such securitisation procedures evolve in the fi rst place may depend on the institutional setting of a housing or mortgage market.
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For covered bonds backed by mortgages, the potential cross-border transfer is primarily limited to a debt obligation, whereas off-balance residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) include more direct rights (and risks) on the underlying mortgage contracts. In the potential event of an insolvency of the issuing and guaranteeing bank, the 
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underlying mortgages defi ne a second line of defence for covered bonds.
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In the last boom-bust cycle, some countries such as Spain and the US experienced a strong growth of securitisations. Altunbas et al. observe a global trend towards securitising mortgages during the last fi nancial cycle.
20
According to their analysis, this trend was promoted even more strongly by rising fi nancial integration during the early years of the European Economic and Monetary Union. 21 In the boom-bust cycle in Spain, the dynamic growth of RMBS was one determining factor prior to the crisis (see Figure 3 ).
Two time phases should be distinguished regarding the prevalence of different motives for mortgage securitisations. Time phase 1 securitisations mainly served the purpose of generating liquidity and/or benefi ts from regulatory arbitrage in the run-up to the housing boom. Time phase 2 securitisations were conducted in order to gener-19 Here, the term "securitisation" refers to RMBS as well as to covered bonds, despite the differences in risk transfers and legal and regulatory arrangements. This deviates from some of the literature, in which only RMBS are classifi ed as securitisations. In our view, this might partly be traced back to the exclusive dominance of mortgagebacked securities against covered bonds in some countries, such as the US. Nevertheless, economic differences of asset-backed securities and covered bonds remain relevant and need to be considered in economic analysis. Additionally, differences in national legislation also have implications for the design of covered bonds and RMBS between countries. ate collateral for central bank refi nancing during the bust. In phase 2, securitisations were either unavailable for sale or no potential buyers were available due to the market turmoil. Thus, there is no relevance for private capital fl ows in this situation. Carbó-Valverde et al. point out that off-balance securitisations lead to lower incentives for banks to monitor credit risks and thus encourage looser lending practices. 22 Nevertheless, this does not mean that securitisations cannot have any useful effect. For example, it could be a positive development if a time phase 3 evolved in which non-performing loans were increasingly securitised and sold to investors who were aware of the risks involved. 23 This would contribute to a necessary clean-up of banks' balance sheets in some countries and would infl uence the loan stock and not the lending standard of new loans.
In their ex post analysis of the crisis, Bernanke et al. also recognised the signifi cant impact of capital fl ows into offbalance securitisations on the build-up of fi nancial stability risks in the US housing bubble. 24 The capital infl ows provided implicit incentives for the US fi nancial system to transform risky loans into highly rated securitised fi nance products. The failure of rating agencies to adequately classify the risks involved promoted and multiplied the subsequent fi nancial stability problems. European investors in particular showed a strong appetite for investments in such US products with top credit ratings. 25 For example, European investors increased their holdings of US asset-backed securities by $475 billion in the years prior to the global fi nancial crisis. 26 The capital needed for these investments was generated by issuing debt instruments:
(…) as became apparent after the fi nancial crisis broke, many European fi nancial institutions were 22 S. C a r b ó -Va l v e r d e e t al., op. cit. Roibás Milán points out that in the Spanish case the highest default risk tranche (equity tranche) of mortgage-backed securities was mostly retained on the balance sheet of the bank's securitisation fund, and the fund remained responsible for the management of the whole portfolio; nevertheless it followed a "pass-through model", i.e. bondholders' repayments and cash fl ows were directly derived from the underlying assets and thus depended on the performance of the portfolio; see I. R o i b á s M il á n : Securitization in Spain: Past developments and expected future trends, BBVA Spain Economic Watch, 2014. 23 See T. H a l e : Securitisations of bad loans set to rise, in: Financial Times, 11 December 2015. 24 B. B e r n a n k e , C. B e r t a u t , L. funding their purchases of U.S. assets with short-term dollar-denominated liabilities like commercial paper or bank deposits, much of which attracted U.S. investors.
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Capital fl ows into such debt instruments were especially prone to a sudden stop when a loss of confi dence initiated a shock reaction at the beginning of the crisis.
Interest rate channel
We complete our analytical framework with our fi nal transmission mechanism, the interest rate channel. Obviously, this channel is not clearly separable from the others. Flows into the other channels are themselves components of total capital fl ows. Therefore, they may likewise infl uence domestic interest rates. Nevertheless, the interest rate channel constitutes an important conduit by itself and is needed from an analytical point of view to evaluate the overall effects of total capital fl ows on the level of domestic interest rates. A concise example is given by the extensive international capital fl ows into the Irish banking system in the run-up to the housing boom. The consolidated balance sheet of the Irish domestic banking sector allows for a distinction between domestic and foreign liability positions. It illustrates that foreign fi nancing played a signifi cant role in the Irish monetary expansion (see Figure 4) . 28 Banks were therefore able to provide more and easier credit based on these capital infl ows. 
Overview of the channels from a fi nancial stability perspective
Summing up, each channel may entail risks to fi nancial stability, both in the destination country as well as in the country of origin of the capital fl ows. Yet, we consider the risks involved to be different in their nature and their potential depending on the channel in question; the central aspects are summarised in Table 1. First of all, the indirect credit channel may have contributed to a risk build-up in some of the most recent housing bubbles, as in the US or Spain. These effects were mainly due to the contribution to lower fi nancing costs and laxer credit standards. Furthermore, this channel opens a window of contagion from the country of origin of the securitised mortgage products to the balance sheets of foreign investors; this was observable in the course of the subprime crisis due to revaluations of RMBS that were originated in the US.
Secondly, the direct credit channel may contribute to the fi nancing of a housing market upswing. Furthermore, the channel exposes foreign lenders (mostly banks) that have activities in the mortgage market in question to housing market distortions. For mortgages denominated in a foreign currency, signifi cant exchange rate movements may pose substantial risks to fi nancial stability due to the potential impact on the ability of private households holding such mortgages to serve their loans.
Finally, the transaction channel and the interest rate channel can be of relevance for domestic housing market developments by fuelling demand, both externally (transactions by foreigners) or internally (lowering interest rates). With regard to the transaction channel, the most critical Foreign Domestic effect would be a contribution to an expectation-driven house price boom. Regarding the interest rate channel, a potential risk build-up can be seen in the side effects of lower domestic fi nancing costs for a stronger and/or prolonged housing market boom. This latter impact is more likely to be signifi cant in countries with substantial current account defi cits.
Some evidence for Germany
As a current account surplus country, Germany may not be the likeliest candidate to demonstrate the possible impact of capital fl ows on its housing market. However, according to our framework on gross capital fl ows and the proposed transmission channels, the country might offer more relevance than is obvious from looking solely at net capital fl ows. 31 Press reports stressing increasing purchases of German residential property by non-residents have received a great deal of attention. Surveys of international institutional investors reveal that they regard the German real estate market as highly attractive, due to its 31 The following analysis of the German case is based on a best-effort approach regarding the availability and quality of data for the coverage of the different channels.
transparency and clear-cut property rights. 32 However, proprietary data from the global real estate services provider Savills illustrates that the volume of sales by institutional foreign investors may be much higher than the volume of purchases during the recent upswing in the German housing market, at least until 2014 (see Figure 5) .
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This could be due to profi t-taking on previous acquisitions of German residential property.
Nevertheless, as stated before, there may be an underreporting of single transactions by non-resident households. Due to the more prevalent "safe haven" motive of some of these investors, pro-cyclical effects may play a greater role here than they do for transactions by institutional investors.
34 Furthermore, the aforementioned attractiveness of German real estate in the view of institutional investors may lead to more buying activity, especially if the euro exchange rate remains weak for a prolonged period. 35 An analysis of the other channels does not reveal a significant impact of gross or "gross gross" capital fl ows on the German housing market either. The potential impact from the indirect channel seems to be rather limited because 32 See for example Ernst & Young: Trendbarometer -Immobilien Investmentmarkt, 2015 ; the German real estate market is often seen as more complex because there is not one dominant market, as in France (Paris) or the UK (London) for example. 33 The data is not available in a regionally separated pattern, which would allow one to analyse which cities and regions may be more or less infl uenced by foreign transactions. According to reports by some real estate agencies, however, most foreign transaction activities are strongly focused on bigger German cities. 34 On the statistical problems of covering foreign real estate transactions in balance of payments statistics, see Deutsche Bundesbank: Real estate transactions by non-residents in Germany, Monthly Report, March 2013 , Vol. 65, No. 3, 2013 For example, the Association of German Pfandbrief Banks attributes a strong rise in prices for multi-family houses in the fi rst half of 2015, inter alia, to a strong appetite for these investments by international institutional investors. See vdp Property Price Index Q2.2015: Demand for German residential and commercial property still strong, 2015. government bonds. In 2014, however, total gross portfolio infl ows nearly came to a halt, whereas in the years shortly after the beginning of the crisis, a withdrawal of external debt fi nancing led to signifi cant outfl ows from the German banking system (see Figure 7) .
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Summing up, the analysis of the potential impact of capital fl ows on the German housing market according to the proposed analytical framework yields no results at least through 2014 that would point to signifi cant effects which could cause a potentially higher risk profi le of the German housing market. In the end, domestic factors like urbanisation trends and low unemployment, in combination with historically low interest rates for mortgages, continue to be the market-dominating factors.
40
Conclusion
Extensive literature focusing on the macro relationship between current account balances, corresponding net capital fl ows and house prices reveals relatively robust linkages. The intensity of this connection strongly depends on the institutional features of the housing and mortgage markets in question. of the very low and, recently, even declining level of mortgage-backed covered bonds and the nearly non-existent usage of RMBS in Germany. 36 Additionally, the traditional on-balance design of German covered bonds avoids incentives for laxer credit standards and loose monitoring in comparison to countries where off-balance securitisations predominate.
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In contrast, the direct credit channel shows more activity. Thus, foreign banks or their affi liates have continuously increased the volume of outstanding mortgages since the recent upswing of the German housing market, which started in 2010. Yet, their decreasing market share indicates that foreign banks or their affi liates are not at the forefront of developments in the recent upswing (see Figure 6) . 38 In the end, effects from the interest rate channel look most intuitive in the context of Germany's safe haven status. Indeed, a surge into German sovereign bondsespecially in 2011 and 2012, caused by fears during the height of the euro crisis -contributed to lower fi nancing costs of the German state, and thereby the general interest level in Germany due to the benchmarking function of 36 The volume of covered bonds backed by residential mortgages in Germany is not to be confused with the higher volume of total covered bonds backed by real estate, which also includes commercial property. 37 In fact, mortgages used for backing covered bonds could be subject to more conservative standards than is usual for mortgages in general in Germany. See Deutsche Bundesbank: Results of a survey on mortgage loans, Financial Stability Review, 2014, pp. 58-61. 38 Whereas Figure 6 shows gross capital infl ows, according to the terminology used in academic literature, in statistical terms it is defi ned as "net" capital fl ows, as outfl ows and infl ows into German portfolio investments are netted. As the term net fl ows is reserved for the highest aggregate of capital fl ows (i.e. the current account balance) in economic literature, differences with the terminology of balance of payments statistics are unavoidable. Capital Flows search analyses more specifi c impact channels (like cross-border fl ows via direct buying and selling of real estate).
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In our approach, we build on the more granular data level of gross capital fl ows and propose a conceptual framework of four transmission channels. Ultimately, domestic factors might play a far more central role for many housing bubbles than external capital fl ows. But as country examples and the analysis of the four central transmission channels illustrate, external factors can support and enhance the extent of a boom-bust cycle and of the financial stability risks involved. In this context, one main result of our analysis is that the risk build-up potential of international capital fl ows for housing markets varies depending on the transmission channel through which foreign capital pours in. Whereas foreign direct investment in real estate is often the focus of public attention, its infl uence on domestic debt sustainability remains rather limited. Nevertheless, situations in which foreign buying activities contribute to expectations of accelerated price growth need to be monitored closely. More critical are capital infl ows via the remaining channels, as they may encourage easier domestic lending and laxer credit standards or entail direct links which expose an economy and, in particular, its housing market to risks from external shocks. Although not a focus of this article, the contagion effects of reverse transmission from a debtor country experiencing fi nancial instability problems to its creditor countries and the general economic development of the global economy should also be kept in mind. This is especially true if the debtor country is a large fi nancial player, as was the case in the US subprime crisis.
In general, the use of more granular data for capital fl ows opens up new analytical possibilities. While the relationship between gross capital fl ows and fi nancial stability is not restricted to the housing market, it may be one of the most important concerns due to the high relevance of housing market developments for fi nancial stability issues. Surveillance and macroprudential policies should therefore be ready to address the composition and sectoral destinations of capital fl ows in an appropriate way. 
